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ARTICLE
ARISTOTLE ON MATHEMATICAL TRUTH
Phil Corkum
Both literalism, the view that mathematical objects simply exist in the
empirical world, and fictionalism, the view that mathematical objects do
not exist but are rather harmless fictions, have been both ascribed to
Aristotle. The ascription of literalism to Aristotle, however, commits
Aristotle to the unattractive view that mathematics studies but a small
fragment of the physical world; and there is evidence that Aristotle
would deny the literalist position that mathematical objects are
perceivable. The ascription of fictionalism also faces a difficult
challenge: there is evidence that Aristotle would deny the fictionalist
position that mathematics is false. I argue that, in Aristotle’s view, the
fiction of mathematics is not to treat what does not exist as if existing
but to treat mathematical objects with an ontological status they lack.
This form of fictionalism is consistent with holding that mathematics is
true.
KEYWORDS: Aristotle; mathematics; truth; fictionalism; literalism
Do mathematical objects exist in some realm inaccessible to our senses? It
may be tempting to deny this. For how could we come to know
mathematical truths, if such knowledge must arise from causal interaction
with non-empirical objects? However, denying that mathematical objects
exist altogether has unsettling consequences. If you deny the existence of
mathematical objects, then you must reject all claims that commit you to
such objects, which would seem to mean rejecting as false much of
mathematics. For, as David Papineau (1990) vividly puts it, it is doublethink
to deny that mathematical objects exist but to continue to believe, for
example, that there are two prime numbers between ten and fifteen. Two
current responses to this problem are literalism and fictionalism. Both
literalists and fictionalists deny the existence of a world of mathematical
objects distinct from the empirical world. But they differ markedly in this
denial. Literalists argue that mathematical objects simply exist in the
empirical world; on this account, mathematical assertions assert true beliefs
about perceivable objects. Fictionalists, on the other hand, hold that, strictly
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speaking, mathematical objects do not exist at all, and so exist in neither the
empirical world nor in some realm distinct from the empirical world. They
argue that mathematical objects are not actual objects but rather harmless
fictions; on this account, mathematical assertions do not assert true beliefs
about the world but merely fictional attitudes.
Although these two positions are apparently quite opposed to one
another, they nonetheless have been both ascribed to Aristotle. Indeed,
Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics seems to exhibit some of the features
characteristic of literalism and some of the features characteristic of
fictionalism. However, Aristotle’s position also exhibits features interest-
ingly different from both positions. I will begin by quickly surveying the
variety of descriptions which Aristotle uses to characterize the relation
between mathematical objects and the perceivable world. This will help to
explain how these apparently opposed positions have been ascribed to
Aristotle. There are three classes of descriptions.
(1) The use of qua ( ) as the adverbial modification of a verb of
consideration.1 One such use is in a negative or, less commonly,
positive description with the object of consideration sensible (or mobile
or physical) things. Thus Meta. M.3 (1077b20ff.):
clearly it is possible that there should also be both propositions and
demonstrations about sensible magnitudes, not however qua sensible but
qua possessed of certain definite qualities. . .. and in the case of mobiles
there will be propositions and sciences, which treat them however not qua
mobile but only qua bodies, or again only qua planes, or only qua lines, or
qua divisibles, or qua indivisibles having position, or only qua indivisibles.2
The other use of is in a positive description with the object of
consideration mathematical. These uses of regularly modify the
mathematical as separate; I will consider this use in more detail in
conjunction with the class of separation descriptions, below. For
example, see Meta. E.1 (1026a9–10): ‘it is clear that some branches of
mathematics are considered as immovable and separate (woristþ).’3
1yEorEi
7
n: Meta. E.1 (1026a10), K.3 (1061a35ff.), M.3 (1078a24ff.). Cf. noEi
7
n: De An. III.7
(431b15); sko/Ei
7
n: Phys. II.2 (194a10); /ragmatEEsyai: Phys. II.2 (193b31); zZtEi
7
n: Meta.
E.1 (1025b1); E’ndE0wEsyai /Er: Meta. M.3 (1977b21). With the use of oÐ n, not , De An. III.7
(431b12).
2Translations based on those collected in McKeon, R., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New
York: Random House, 1941). Cf. Phys. II.2 (194a9–12): ‘Geometry investigates physical lines
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fnsik. Also Meta. K.3. (1061a34).
3Cf. De An. III.7 (431b15–16); APo. I.18 (81b4–5). An exception, with in a negative
description with the object of consideration mathematical, occurs at APo. I.13 (79a7–10); I will




































(2) The sensible is abstracted from the mathematical. Here, two
compounds of aºrEi
8
n are used.4 First, compounds with Eri are used
to describe the ‘stripping off’ of the nonmathematical properties of
sensible objects to leave only the mathematical. Thus Meta. K.3
(1061a28–33):
the mathematician investigates abstractions for before beginning his
investigation he strips off ( EriElon) all the sensible qualities, e. g.
weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold
and the other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative and
continuous.5
The second compounds are with  o. This is a rare use in verb form.6
More common are substantive phrases such as t E’x fairE’ sEon
lEgómEna.7
(3) The mathematical is separated from the sensible. The verb of
separation here is most commonly worzEin thus Phys. 2.2 (193b31–
34): ‘the mathematician, though he too treats of these things [the
properties of the earth and the world], . . .separates (worzEi) them; for
in thought they are separable (woristþ) from motion.’8 Note that in
separation descriptions the verb of separation is regularly qualified in
some way. Thus in the Phys. passage quoted above, woristþ is
qualified with the dative, t+
7
nosEi.9 More common is the use of as a
qualification, as in the Meta. E.1 passage classified under the
consideration class of descriptions. A special case is the description
at Meta. M.3 (1078a21–22): ‘[the mathematician] studies what has not
4Other compounds – for example, na–aºrEi
8
n (‘extract’: Phys. I.4) and dia–aºrE0sin (‘division’:
Phys. III.6) – are used in senses unrelated to mathematical abstraction.
5Cf. Meta. Z.3 (1029a11).
6APo. I.5 (74a37-b1). Also Meta. Z.3 (1029a16), a passage whose credibility for the ascription
of any view to Aristotle I will draw into question later. There are other uses of farEsin
unrelated to mathematical abstraction: for example, Meta. D.22 (1022b31), with farEsin
associated with privation. There are also uses of fairEi
´
n in context of the definition of non-
substance categories; these uses are not in explicit relation to mathematical abstraction.
7in explicit apposition with t mayZmatikþ, De Caelo (299a14–18); perhaps not referring to
strictly mathematical abstract objects, APo. I.18 (81b3); as t E’n fairE’ sEi lEgómEna, De An.
III.7 (431b12–13), III.8 (432b5); as t E’n fairE0sEi, 3nta De An. III.4 (429b21); as t di’
fairE0sE˝n Çstin in apposition with t mayZmatikþ and contrasted with Çx Çm Eirºan, NE
(1042a18). The t . . .lEgómEna construction is ambiguous. Ross (Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2
vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924, 2nd ed. 1956)) translates as ‘the so-called . . .’; an
alternative reading is ‘the things said as a result of . . .’.
8worzEin from 0lZ, De An. III.4 (429b21); without an indirect object, Meta. M.3 (quoted
below); cf.  otEmómEnai, Meta. G.1 (1003a24–5); ErigracómEnai, Meta. E.1.
9Hardie and Gaye’s translation of this dative phrase as ‘in thought,’ suggests a locative sense;
this would support my subsequent argument against extension as a mathematical matter.
However, this is a rare use of the dative (see Sonneschein x434); the sense may be instead
instrumental.



































been separated by separating (tò m kEworismE’ non yEZ worsan);’
here the participle of separation is qualified by a negative phrase.
These descriptions present an ambiguous picture of Aristotle’s view of
mathematical existence. Are mathematical objects properties or entities?
Consider APo. 1.5 (74a35ff.):
The angles of a brazen isosceles triangle are equal to two right angles: but
eliminate brazen and isosceles and the attribute remains.
Here Aristotle speaks of taking away both properties (isosceles) and matter
(bronze). If abstraction is the elimination of properties, mathematical objects
would seem to be physical objects considered as if they did not have certain
properties. Consideration descriptions with the object of consideration sensible
substances tend to support this view: recall, in the Meta. M.3 (1077b20ff.)
passage, quoted above, the mathematician is represented as considering
sensible things (but not as sensible) and mobile things (but not as mobile).
Those who take a literalist interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of
mathematics, and especially those who hold that mathematics studies in part
a distinctly mathematical matter contained in the physical world, tend to
emphasize these descriptions, as we’ll see. On the other hand, if abstraction is
the elimination of the matter of a sensible substance or the isolation of its
mathematical features, mathematical objects would seem to be certain
properties of sensible things – properties such as triangularity. Those who
take a fictionalist interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics tend
to emphasize these descriptions, as we’ll see. The ambiguity between the two
pictures apparently presented by these descriptions is noted by Ian Mueller
(1970, 162ff.) and Julia Annas (1976, 30), and is one reason why both literalism
and fictionalism has been ascribed to Aristotle.
Here is a sketch of the argument of the paper. I will begin by discussing
literalism in contemporary philosophy of mathematics and the ascription of
literalism to Aristotle. The view faces challenges as an interpretation of
Aristotle: the ascription commits Aristotle to the unattractive view that
mathematics studies but a small fragment of the physical world; and there is
evidence that Aristotle would deny the literalist position that mathematical
objects are perceptible (x1). I will also consider in detail the best developed
literalist interpretation of Aristotle. The interpretation rests on the claim
that Aristotle has a doctrine of a uniquely mathematical matter; I will argue
that this claim is false. Although the considerations of these two sections of
the paper fall short of refuting the ascription of literalism to Aristotle, they
do shift the burden of proof on those who would persist in the ascription
(x2). I will then discuss fictionalism in contemporary philosophy of
mathematics and the ascription of fictionalism to Aristotle. This ascription
also faces a difficult challenge: there is evidence that Aristotle would deny




































in Aristotle’s view, the fiction of mathematics is not to treat what does not
exist as if existing but to treat mathematical objects with an ontological
status they lack. This form of fictionalism is consistent with holding that
mathematics is true (x4).
1
I will begin by briefly discussing literalism in recent philosophy of mathe-
matics. I have noted that mathematical truths, as standardly interpreted,
commit us to the existence of mathematical objects. In contemporary
philosophy of mathematics the most pressing difficulty with such commit-
ment is epistemological. As Paul Benacerraf (1973) framed the issue, if there
is a transcendent world of mathematical entities, it is unclear how such a
world could cause our knowledge of it. The difficulty, then, is to reconcile our
best current theories of truth with a causal theory of knowledge.
Mathematical literalists10 accept that mathematics commits us to the
existence of mathematical objects and attempt to avoid the epistemological
difficulties resulting from this commitment by arguing that we indeed do
have perceptual knowledge of these mathematical objects. On this account
then, we simply are in causal interaction with mathematical objects.
Penelope Maddy, for example, argues that we simply perceive sets.11 She
calls such set-theoretical realism Aristotelian, not Platonic in part ‘since sets,
on the view [she is] concerned with, are taken to be individuals or
particulars, not universals.’12 Donald Gillies has endorsed some of Maddy’s
views and also the designation of these views as Aristotelian.13 Gillies writes
that it seems ‘highly plausible to claim that sets exist in the material world.
Examples of naturally occurring sets would be: the stars of a galaxy, the
planets of the solar system. . .. If sets exist in the material world, then it
seems reasonable to suppose that we might on occasion perceive a set with
our senses.’14
The ascription of literalism to Aristotle has textual support. Recall that,
in passages such as 193b23–25, quoted above, Aristotle asserts that
mathematical objects are part of the physical world. But the ascription
10The term is Chihara’s (Constructibility and Mathematical Existence (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990), 3ff.).
11Maddy, P., ‘Perception and Mathematical Intuition’, Philosophical Review, 89 (1980): 163–96,
178ff.; also Maddy, P., Realism in Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
12Maddy (1980, 163).
13 Gillies, D., ‘Do we need Mathematical Objects?’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
43 (1992): 263–78., 266ff.
14Gillies, D., An empiricist philosophy of mathematics and its implications for the history of
mathematics’, in The Growth of Mathematical Knowledge, edited by E. Grosholz and H. Breger
(Synthese Library/Volume 289, Kluwer, 2000) 9. Gillies believes that sets are perceptible since
observation is theory-laden. Set-theoretic literalism has received some critical attention; see, for
example, Chihara (1990, 194–215).



































faces two challenges. First, can Aristotle mean that all mathematical objects
whatsoever are physical? The set-theoretical literalism of Maddy and Gillies
may be a plausible position, but extending literalism to other branches of
mathematics is problematic. For physical objects lack the exactitude
characteristic of many kinds of mathematical objects. It seems, for example,
that we do not encounter perfectly straight lines in the physical world. The
ascription of literalism to Aristotle, then, appears to saddle him with an
implausible view.
The best developed literalist interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of
mathematics is to be found in Mueller (1970). Mueller resolves the problem
that most mathematical properties of sensible substances lack the exactitude
characteristic of the subject matter of mathematics by arguing that
Aristotle’s claim that the physical world contains mathematical objects is
merely the claim that the physical world contains a matter of pure extension
– whose only features are length, width and depth – and that this is also the
basis of geometric objects. So, on Mueller’s view, Aristotle does not claim
that all mathematical objects are contained in the physical world. Rather, he
holds that the physical and mathematical realms overlap. Although physical
lines and triangles lack the exactitude characteristic of geometric objects, the
physical world shares with mathematics the precise extensional features of
length, width and depth.
The Phys. 2.2 passage quoted above might be read so as to lend support
to Mueller’s interpretation. However, an unattractive result of this view is
that Aristotle’s claim that the physical world contains mathematical
objects is severely restricted. The physical world only contains only a small
part of geometry. In response, Jonathan Lear (1982) argues that it is not
so implausible to ascribe to Aristotle the view that there are in fact exact
mathematical objects such as triangles in the world. This allows much
more of mathematics to be contained in the physical world than Mueller’s
view allows. However, there are unattractive results of this view as well.
For although the physical world contains much of geometry, in Lear’s
view, standard geometry is a part of a mere sliver of the physical world.
Moreover, Lear concedes that not all geometric objects are found in the
physical world. So, although the overlap between the physical world and
mathematics is less restricted than it is on Mueller’s view, it is also
restricted.
A second problem for ascribing literalism to Aristotle is that he would
reject the literalist view that we can perceive mathematical objects.
Aristotle’s account of mathematical concept acquisition concerns a
progression from common sensibles to objects for thought. The mathema-
tical genera are among the common sensibles (koina) described at De An. 3.1
(425a14–19):
that which we perceive incidentally through this or that special sense, e. g.




































movement, e. g. magnitude by movement, and therefore also figure (for figure
is a species of magnitude), what is at rest by the absence of movement, and
number by the negation of continuity.
Aristotle seems to hold that we perceive geometric and arithmetic properties
only incidentally through such special sense faculties as sight. To continuous
quanta correspond the common sensible of magnitude; to discrete quanta
correspond the common sensible of number. Since these are not the objects
of any one sense faculty, we perceive mathematical properties through the
sensus communis. However, it is not these common sensibles per se which the
mathematician studies. See De Mem. 1(449b31ff.):
Without a presentation intellectual activity is impossible. For there is in such
activity an incidental affection identical with one also incidental in geometrical
demonstrations. For in the latter case, though we do not for the purpose of the
proof make any use of the fact that the quantity in the triangle [for example,
which we have drawn] is determinate, we nevertheless draw it determinate in
quantity. . . [for] one envisages it as if it had determinate quantity, though
subsequently, in thinking it, he abstracts from its determinateness. . .. [This]
presentation is an affection of the sensus communis.
The use of diagrammatic representation in geometric proofs is used as an
example to illustrate Aristotle’s claim that representations are a condition
for any thinking. Just as a particular proof employs but does not concern
just a particular diagram, so too an episode of thought employs but does not
concern a particular representation. Notice that thought does not use a
visual representation but a common sensible.15 Since mathematics is a field
of thought, mathematicians do not study the common sensibles which are
employed in mathematical proof and which are the perceived mathematical
properties of sensible substances. So mathematical objects are not
themselves perceivable.
The ascription of literalism to Aristotle faces these two challenges. Before
turning to the ascription of fictionalism to Aristotle, I will discuss the
question whether there is a distinctly mathematical matter.
2
I’ve noted that the best developed literalist interpretation of Aristotle’s
philosophy of mathematics ascribes to him a doctrine of mathematical
matter as pure extension. Aristotle would of course recognize that both
physical and geometric objects have extensional features of length, breadth
15Although the power to represent is the faculty of the imagination: see Caston, V., ‘Why
Aristotle needs imagination’, Phronesis, 41 (1996): 20–55.



































and depth. But would he describe extension as a kind of mathematical
matter? In this section, I turn to the evidence on which a doctrine of
mathematical matter may be ascribed to Aristotle. Although some of the
ablest commentators – ancient and recent – have advocated this interpreta-
tion, the textual support is tenuous; furthermore, what passages there are,
are open to alternative readings.
The ascription to Aristotle of a doctrine of mathematical matter rests on
two points. First, Aristotle is represented as holding a doctrine of either
noetic matter or prime matter. Second, this kind of matter is identified with
extension. Combining these two points, it is argued that for Aristotle
mathematics concerns a kind of intellectual matter, extension, which is
either itself prime matter or the first layer of form placed on prime matter.
This interpretation stems from the ancient commentators and has been
advocated in recent scholarship by Mueller (1990, 464–65), who writes:
Mathematical objects are embodied in pure extension underlying physical
objects; the geometer’s abstraction of non-geometric properties enables him to
apprehend these things which satisfy the mathematician’s definitions.
Against this interpretation, I will first argue that the passages cited in
support of the ascription to Aristotle of a doctrine of mathematical matter
are inconclusive. Recent advocates of this interpretation candidly acknowl-
edge this. Mueller (1990, 465), for example, acknowledges the poverty of
textual support: ‘This interpretation, which I [Mueller] have espoused, has
the disadvantage of assigning to Aristotle a theory about which one might
expect him to have been more explicit if he held it.’ On the basis of this lack
of evidence, I am sceptical that the ascription is correct. Second, I will
address further difficulties for the position. On the basis of these difficulties,
I believe that a mathematical matter could not explain mathematical
existence even if the doctrine could be ascribed to Aristotle.
I turn first to passages which lend support to the ascription to Aristotle of
a doctrine of noetic matter. Although Aristotle explicitly describes
mathematical objects as separated both from motion (and so from what
we may call kinetic matter) and from sensible matter,16 there is evidence
elsewhere for another kind of Aristotelian matter, noetic matter. I will argue
that this evidence supports the view that mathematics must have for
Aristotle a material explanation; but that the evidence is insufficient to
ascribe to Aristotle a doctrine of mathematical matter.
There are only two sources for the ascription to Aristotle of a doctrine of
noetic matter. The first is Meta. Z.10 (1036a9–12):
And some matter is perceptible and some intelligible, perceptible matter being
for instance bronze and wood and all matter that is changeable, and intelligible




































matter being that which is present in perceptible things not qua perceptible,
i. e. the objects of mathematics.
Here, mathematical objects and noetic matter are explicitly identified.
Unfortunately, this passage is a postea addita, and reflects not Aristotle but
the very tradition of Aristotelian interpretation with which I disagree.17 The
second source for a doctrine of noetic matter is Meta. H.6 (1045a33–5):
Of matter some is intelligible, some perceptible, and in a formula there is
always an element of matter as well as one of actuality; e. g. the circle is ‘a
plane figure’.
Here Aristotle refers to noetic matter. However, if we consider the context of
this passage, I think that it will be clear that the further identification of this
noetic matter with mathematical objects is implausible. The context of this
passage is Aristotle’s resolution of the problem of the unity of a binomial
definition. The genus stands in relation to the species as something potential to
something actual. This allows the composite to be a unity. A mathematical
example is used to illustrate this principle. The definition of a circle, a plane
figure with every point equidistant from the centre, has a generic element, ‘a
plane figure’. It is such an element of a definition which may be called noetic
matter. The noetic matter referred to here is therefore not exclusively
mathematical but generic. In so far as mathematical definitions require genera,
mathematics has a material explanation; however, this in itself does not entail
that there exists a uniquely mathematical matter.
I turn next to the second set of passages, cited in support of the
identification of either noetic matter or prime matter with extension. I will
argue that these passages do not support this identification. Here too there
are only two relevant passages. The first passage is Meta. Z.3 (1029a7–19):
We have now outlined the nature of substance, showing that it is that which is
not predicated of a stratum, but of which all else is predicated. But . . . on this
view matter becomes substance. For if this is not substance, it baffles us to say
what else is. When all else is stripped off evidently nothing but matter remains.
For while the rest are affections, products, and potencies of bodies, length,
breadth, and depth are quantities and not substances (for a quantity is not a
substance), but the substance is rather that to which these belong primarily.
But when length and breadth and depth are taken away we see nothing left
unless there is something that is bounded by these; so that to those who
consider the question thus matter alone must seem to be substance.
Much has been made of this passage by those who ascribe to Aristotle a
doctrine of prime matter. I do not find this ascription convincing; but I will
17Jaeger, OCT.



































not pursue this debate further here.18 For my purposes it is sufficient to
consider the use of this passage to ascribe to Aristotle a doctrine of
mathematical matter of pure extension or dimension. The passage lends
support to this interpretation only if we can take the phrase, ‘something
bounded by these [dimensions]’ to positively assert the existence of a kind of
matter which is extension and which is the subject of dimensions, and so to
reject the preceding phrase, ‘there is nothing left.’ Sorabji, for example,
argues that the phrase is such an assertion.19 However, this reading of the
passage is not entirely convincing when we take into consideration the
context of the passage. Aristotle is entertaining the claim that subject
(hupokeimenon) and substance (ousia) are identical. This claim is rejected;
the passage, as I read it, supports this rejection by reducing the claim to an
absurdity. On the account that subject and substance are identical, it seems
that matter is substance. This would violate any interpretation of
Aristotelian substance: although controversial, substance is taken to be
either the individual composite of form and matter or the species-form.
Our second passage is Phys. 4.2 (209b5–11):
If, then, we look at the question in this [preceding] way the place of a thing is
its form. But, if we regard the place as the extension of the magnitude, it is the
matter. For this is different from the magnitude: it is what is contained and
defined by the form, as by a bounding plane. Matter or the indeterminate is of
this nature; when the boundary and attributes of a sphere are taken away,
nothing but the matter is left.
The argument here is that place seems to be matter in so far as place seems
to be extension. Aristotle later dismisses both the view that place is matter
and the view that place is extension.20 But this in itself would not refute the
identification of matter and extension. However, this passage does not
identify matter and extension but rather draws a simile between the two:
matter is like (toiouton) extension.21 As such, little support for the
identification of matter and extension can be drawn from this passage.
I have argued that the passages cited do not provide conclusive support to
the ascription to Aristotle of a doctrine of mathematical matter. It might be
18Scholars who argue against the orthodox ascription to Aristotle of a doctrine of prime matter
include King, H. R., ‘Aristotle without Prima Materia’, Journal for the History of Ideas, 17
(1956): 370–89 and Charlton, W., Aristotle’s Physics Books I and II (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992).
Scholars defending this orthodoxy include Solmsen (1958) and Robinson, H. M., ‘Prime Matter
in Aristotle’, Phronesis, 19 (1974): 168–88. For a recent bibliography, see Bostock, D. Aristotle’s
Metaphysics Books [Zeta-Theta] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
19Sorabji, R. R. K., Matter, Space and Motion (London: Duckworth, 1983, 6). I agree with
Sorabji that the ‘unless . . .’ phrase is neither a gloss (contra Schofield, , M. ‘Metaph. Z 3: some
suggestions’, Phronesis, 17 (1972): 97–101, 97) nor a reference ‘to a more familiar kind of
subject, such as bronze’ (contra Robinson (1974, 187)).
20At 211b29–212a2 and 211b14–29 respectively.




































said that there is a distinctively mathematical matter, but only insofar as
extension is the genus of geometric species. For Aristotle views the genus-
species relation as analogous to the matter-form relationship. As such, no
conclusions can be drawn as to the point of contact between the sensible or
material world and the realm of the mathematical. Although the
considerations of the last two sections of the paper fall short of refuting
the ascription of literalism to Aristotle, they do shift the burden of proof
onto those who would persist in the ascription.
3
I turn to fictionalism in contemporary philosophy of mathematics, the
ascription of fictionalism to Aristotle and the points of agreement and
disagreement between Aristotle and fictionalists. As I’ve noted, if you deny
the existence of mathematical objects, then it seems that you must reject all
claims that commit you to such objects, which means rejecting most of
mathematics as standardly understood. Contemporary mathematical
fictionalists such as Hartry Field (1980) accept this consequence. According
to mathematical fictionalism, mathematicians make the fictitious assump-
tion that mathematical objects exist: such an assumption, they admit, is
false; but the fiction, they assure us, is harmless and useful. Fictionalists
disarm the apparent commitment to mathematical objects in mathematical
statements by showing how in principle these statements could be rewritten
into synonymous statements which do not have problematic ontological
commitments. One strategy takes the form of a reduction to quantificational
statements. Although the nature of these quantifiers is controversial, I will
present an example using existential quantifiers: this is the simplest case.
Consider the equation
ðAÞ 2þ 3 ¼ 5
A reductionist reading of this equation, with the numerical quantifier (9n)
an abbreviation for a sequence of n distinct existential quantifiers, would
translate (A) as follows:
ðBÞ ð8VÞð8WÞ½ð92xÞðVxÞ&ð93xÞðWxÞ&  ð9xÞðVx&WxÞ
 ð95xÞðVx _WxÞ:
That is, the equation 2þ 3¼ 5 can be read as saying merely that if there
are two Vs and three different Ws, then there will be five things which are V
or W. Where the arithmetical equation mentions abstract objects, the
quantificational statement is free of such reference. Such quantificational
statements are elephantine: this is partly why mathematics is a useful fiction.



































Lear (1982) and others have ascribed mathematical fictionalism to
Aristotle. The ascription has some initial plausibility. As we’ve seen,
Aristotle sometimes describes the relation between mathematical objects
and the sensible world in ways which suggest fictionalism. For example,
Aristotle claims that mathematicians separate mathematical properties in
thought. And this sounds rather like the claim that mathematical objects
don’t exist but mathematicians make the fictitious assumption that they do.
Is this the right picture for Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics?
One difficulty with ascribing fictionalism to Aristotle is that the fictionalist
holds that mathematics is, strictly speaking, false; but Aristotle explicitly
holds that mathematics is true.22 Those who would persist with the
ascription are hard pressed to explain this apparent inconsistency. Lear
(1982, 191), for example, writes:
For Aristotle, mathematics is true, not in virtue of the existence of separated
mathematical objects to which its terms refer, but because it accurately
describes the structural properties and relations which actual physical objects
do have. Talk of nonphysical mathematical objects is a fiction, one that may
be convenient and should be harmless if one correctly understands
mathematical practice.
However, that mathematics ‘accurately describes the structural properties
and relations which actual physical objects do have’ explains why the
assumption that nonphysical mathematical objects exists is a useful fiction; it
doesn’t show that, despite this, mathematics is nonetheless true. For
example, Papineau (1990, 173) writes:
Lear . . . does seem to want it both ways. He shows how the possibility of
sticking to beliefs which do not involve abstract objects makes it both harmless
but useful to work with propositions that do. But then he claims that this
yields a sense in which the latter propositions are true.
To give another example, Hussey puts forward the interesting and
sophisticated interpretation that mathematics for Aristotle concerns
representational objects.23 A representational object is a nonexistent object
which can stand for a variety of existing objects which approximate it.
However, Hussey (1991, 127) offers the explanation that no falsity results
from the false assumption of the existence of fictitious objects because the
22Phys. 193b35; Meta. 1078a18–19.
23For the original exposition on representational objects, see Kit Fine, Reasoning with Arbitrary
Objects (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). This form of fictionalism entails the rejection of the principle





































assumption is ‘eventually discharged.’ This is less than satisfying. The
difficulty from our perspective is that a mathematical claim is true in
virtue of the object picked out by its referring expressions being correctly
characterized by the predicate expression. So, to take again our example,
‘This triangle has interior angles of 180 degrees’ is true in virtue of there
being a referent for ‘this triangle’ which has the feature ascribed to it by
the predicate. On this view, it is difficult to see how discharging the
fictional assumption of the existence of the referent for ‘this triangle’
would vindicate the truth of ‘This triangle has interior angles of 180
degrees’.
So, like the fictionalist, Aristotle holds that mathematics ascribes to
mathematical properties of sensible substances an ontological status they in
fact lack. However, unlike a contemporary fictionalist, Aristotle does not
believe that this requires that we deny that mathematical objects exist or that
mathematics is false. To resolve this tension, I will next argue that the
ascription to Aristotle of fictionalism is typically made within an
anachronistic and misleading framework. For I am in broad agreement
with those, such as Lear and Hussey, who ascribe fictionalism to Aristotle.
But by placing the ascription in an appropriate context, I hope to contribute
to this line of interpretation by providing a satisfying fictionalist account of
Aristotle’s views on mathematical truth.
4
I began this paper with Benacerraf’s problem for the philosophy of
mathematics: on the best current theories of knowledge and truth, our
knowledge of mathematical truths requires causal interaction with
mathematical objects; yet mathematical objects do not seem to exist among
perceptible objects. Aristotle is not explicitly concerned with this problem.
Rather, his concern is to explain in what sense mathematical objects exist,
given that they can be neither separate from, nor present in, sensible
substances. Aristotle raises this aporia at 997b12–34. I will discuss
Aristotle’s reasons for claiming that mathematical objects are inseparable
from sensible substances in a moment. Geometric objects cannot be present
in sensible substances for then there will be co-located solids, co-located
lines, and so on. Notice that mathematical objects cannot be said of sensible
substances, for items and what are said of them are synonymous in
Aristotle’s idiosyncratic sense of synonymy, articulated at 1a6–8: they share
both a name and a definition. But the definition of a circle, for example,
does not define a circular sensible substance. So it seems that mathematical
objects fall outside the classification of beings in the Categories: they are not
non-substances present in a sensible subject; they are not universals said of a
subject; and they are not themselves independent subjects existing separately
from sensible substances.



































Aristotle returns to this aporia at 1077b12–33:
It has been sufficiently stated that mathematical objects are neither substances
apart from bodies, nor prior to perceptible things in being but only in
definition, nor capable of existing somewhere separate. But since it was not
possible for them to exist in perceptible things either, it is plain that they either
do not exist at all or exist in a certain manner (tropon tina esti) and, because of
this, do not exist without qualification (ouch haplôs estin). For being is said in
many ways. . .. Thus since it is true to say without qualification that not only
things which are separable but also things which are inseparable exist (for
example, that moveable things exist), it is true also to say without qualification
that the objects of mathematics exist.
Aristotle dismisses without comment the position that mathematical objects
do not exist at all. (I will discuss this dismissal in a moment.) Rather, we can
truly say that mathematical objects exist, for they exist in a qualified way.
Aristotle sees the possibility that they have qualified existence as a
consequence of his position that being is said in many ways. Aristotle
expresses this ontological thesis in several passages. For example, at
1003a33-b10 he writes:
being is said in many ways, but in relation to one certain nature and not merely
homonymously. Just as everything which is healthy is related to health, one by
preserving it, another by producing it, and another by being a symptom of
health . . . so too being is said in many ways but all in relation to one principle.
For some are called beings because they are substances, others because they
are affections of a substance, others because they are paths towards substance,
or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or
generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or
negations of one of these things or of substance itself.
I will call the claim that something ‘is said in many ways’ multivocity. The
multivocity of being is at least the view that ‘exists’ is predicated variously.24
I next will explain how these views – the position that mathematical objects
are inseparable from sensible substances, the claim that being is a multivocal
and the distinction between qualified and unqualified being – shed light on
Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics.
I will begin with Aristotle’s claim that mathematical objects are
inseparable from sensible substances. Aristotle regularly uses separation
terminology to indicate ontological independence. Fine (1984) argues per-
24An associated view is that being is a connected homonym. Irwin, T., ‘Homonymy’, Review of
Metaphysics, 34 (1981): 523–44. and Shields, C., Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the





































suasively that separation in Aristotle is an asymmetric relation. Fine also
holds that separation indicates a capacity for independent existence. But in
my (2008) I’ve argued at length that one item can be separate from a second
for Aristotle, even when it is impossible for the one to exist apart from the
other. Rather, one thing is separate from another just in case an account of
the former’s ontological status as an existent can be made without reference
to the latter. I can not rehearse fully this argument here. But let me sketch
one consideration in favour of this interpretation of separation terminology.
Consider propria, necessary but inessential properties. A classic example of a
proprium for humans is risibility. An individual human can not exist apart
from her proprium and so can not lack risibility. But by claiming that an
individual substance is separate from its properties, Aristotle appears to be
committed to holding that an individual human is separate from her
property of risibility.25
Aristotle holds that there are a variety of different kinds of entities:
individual substances such as Callias, universal substances such as humanity,
and individuals and universals among such other categories as qualities and
quantities are all among things that have an ontological status. Of all these,
only individual substances have their ontological status independently of
standing in a relation to some other kind of entity. All other entities have
their ontological status in virtue of standing in a relation to some individual
substance or other. Mathematical objects have their ontological status in
virtue of standing in a relation to sensible substances. I believe that this is
what Aristotle means by claiming at 1078a21–22 that mathematical objects
are not separate from sensible substances. He does not mean that
mathematical objects can not exist apart from sensible substances, but that
they possess their ontological status in virtue of standing in some relation to
sensible substances.26 I will not discuss here the nature of this dependence. To
do so would require a lengthy discussion of Aristotle’s views on abstraction.
However the precise nature of a mathematical object’s dependence on
25Aristotle holds that substances, alone of the categories, are separate: see, for example, 185a31–
2, 1029a27–8. I discuss the evidence for taking this to mean that substances are ontologically
independent from all other entities, in my (2008).
26This interpretation of separation terminology helps to explain the inseparability of
mathematical objects from sensible substances. Aristotle argues at 1077b12–39 that mathema-
tical objects cannot be separate from sensible substances on pain of regress. If there is a geometric
figure such as a circle separate from circular sensible substances, then there will be another circle
in addition to the first two, and so on. The argument here is obscure. Aristotle may be offering an
argument similar to his objection to Platonic Forms at Peri Ideon 84.23–4 and elsewhere. Cohen,
S. M. (‘The Logic of the Third Man’, Philosophical Review, 80 (1971): 448–75) and others have
argued that such arguments are explanatory regresses. On this interpretation of 1077b12–39, a
geometric figure such as the circle is posited so to explain the circularity of physical circles. But
Aristotle canvasses the worry that the geometric figure is itself circular and furthermore cannot
itself be referenced in an explanation of that circularity. Hence the need for a third circle. It
would be unclear why an explanatory independence would follow from a capacity for separate
existence, but explanatory independence is plausibly a consequence of ontological independence.



































sensible substances need not concern us. It suffices for our present purposes
to show that mathematical objects are existents which are in some way or
other ontologically dependent on sensible substances.27
For Aristotle, ontological dependence is closely connected to predic-
ability. The predicability of an expression suggests that the referent of that
expression is ontologically dependent on another entity; the impredicability
of an expression, on the other hand, suggests that the referent of that
expression is ontologically independent. Expressions referring to individual
substances are the only expressions which cannot be predicated of another
entity. Expressions referring to other kinds of entities are predicable of
individual substances. This is Aristotle’s methodology in the Categories: the
predicability or impredicability of an expression provides a rationale for a
preliminary classification of the referent of that expression as ontologically
dependent or independent.
However, within mathematical discourse, certain mathematical objects
play the role of impredicable subjects. Entities which are, strictly speaking,
dependent on sensible substances are, in mathematics, the subjects of
predications. Consider a mathematical claim such as ‘This triangle has
interior angles equal to 180 degrees’. Here a mathematical property is
predicated of a subject which cannot be predicated of another mathema-
tical entity. The impredicability of the subject, within mathematical
discourse, suggests that the referent of the expression is ontologically
independent with respect to other mathematical entities. I propose that this
is, according to Aristotle, the conceit of mathematics—a conceit which
resembles mathematical fictionalism insofar as the mathematician treats
mathematical objects with an ontological status they in fact lack. However,
where contemporary mathematical fictionalists hold that mathematics
treats what does not in fact exist as if it does exist, Aristotle holds that
mathematics treats what exists qualifiedly as if it exists unqualifiedly. I
believe that this is what Aristotle means when he says, in the 1078a21–22
passage mentioned above, that the mathematician separates what, strictly
speaking, is not separate from sensible substances, and when he claims at
193b31–34 that the mathematician separates mathematical objects in
thought.
Aristotle is then an ontological pluralist. Among existents are both
entities which are ontologically independent and are the referents of subject
terms within a canonical discourse, and entities which are ontologically
dependent. With this discussion of Aristotle’s metaontological views in the
background, I return now to the ascription of fictionalism to Aristotle.
Fictionalism is a position in the contemporary philosophy of mathematics
which arises within a framework that distances us from Aristotle. In
27On mathematical abstraction see Cleary, J. ‘On the Terminology of ‘‘Abstraction’’ in
Aristotle’, Phronesis, 30 (1985): 13–45 and on Aristotle’s use of the qua operator see Lear, J.,




































particular, there are in this framework anachronistic assumptions of
ontological monism, and a corresponding unitary account of ontological
commitment.
Recall, the difficulty with this ascription is that Aristotle holds that
mathematics is true but contemporary fictionalists hold that mathematics is
false. We have seen that on contemporary theories of truth a sentence
expresses a truth just in case the referent of its subject exists and is correctly
characterized by the predicate of the sentence. The only demand on truth for
Aristotle, however, is to say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is
not.28 And Aristotle is catholic in his acceptance of what is. Qualities,
quantities, mathematical objects and so on are all things that are.29 The
interesting philosophical question is, for Aristotle, in what way things which
are – that is to say, whether or not they have claim to their ontological status
independently of standing in a relation to something else and so
simpliciter.30 The question of mathematical existence is not one of existence
per se but of the dependence on, or independence from, those items which
have uncontroversially independent status as beings, sensible individual
substances.
On Quine’s account of ontological commitment, we are committed to the
values of the variables and range of the quantifiers in those true statements
which are indispensible for science. Others have proposed alternative
accounts of ontological commitment. Azzouni (2007), for example, holds
that we are committed to the extension of the existence predicate. Cameron
(2007) holds that we are committed only to the truth makers: on this view,
mathematics may be true but, if the truth makers of mathematical truths are
not mathematical objects, then the truth of mathematics fails to commit us
to the existence of mathematical objects. Aristotle seems to view truths as
committed to the referents of the terms employed in canonical statements
expressing those truths. Being the referent of either a term which is an
impredicable subject or a term predicable of an impredicable subject suffices
for inclusion in the ontology of the Categories.
However, although Aristotle is catholic in his acceptance of what exists,
he is not indiscriminate. There are filters for this ontology. First, we are
committed to the referents of terms in reputable opinions.31 And second,
there are exceptions, and Aristotle can deny an existence claim even when
they are consequences of reputable opinions, such as alleged truths with
28‘To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that
it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true’ (Metaphysics 1011b25).
29Categories 1.
30See 1077B33–5: ‘We truly say without qualification not only that the separable things exist but
also that the inseparable things exist.’ I’ve argued in my (2008) that the sense of some separation
terminology in Aristotle is that separate things have claim to the status of a being independently
of standing in a relation to something else, and so have being simpliciter.
31For this interpretation of endoxa in Aristotle, see for example, Irwin (1989)



































fictional or non-denoting terms and philosophical theses such as those
purporting the existence of Love or Strife. Schaffer (2009, 352)
characterizes Aristotle as taking a ‘permissive disinterest’ in such existence
questions as whether there are numbers. In support of this characteriza-
tion, Schaffer cites my (2008) observation, an interpretation of 1076a36–
37, that ‘the philosophical question is not whether such things exist but
how they do.’ Schaffer goes on to advocate what he calls the Aristotelian
view that the task of metaphysics is to say not what exists but what
grounds what, and its method is to deploy diagnostics for what is
fundamental, together with diagnostics for grounding derivative entities on
fundamental entities. There is much that I find attractive in Schaffer’s
characterization of metaphysics. But, although I ascribe to Aristotle the
view that the philosophical work of metaphysics predominantly lies in
articulating how things exist, I now hesitate to characterize Aristotle as
disinterested in existence questions altogether. Aristotle’s philosophical
method is typically to begin by surveying reputable opinions, to tease out
aporetic difficulties, and eventually to resolve the aporia by introducing a
new distinction. Mathematical discourse, of course, is constituted by the
expert opinions of mathematicians and so makes at least a prima facie
commitment to the existence of mathematical objects. Recall that Aristotle
dismisses without comment in 1077b12–33, quoted above, the option that
mathematical objects do not exist at all. I believe that it is in this spirit
that Aristotle does not consider the non-existence of mathematical objects:
the reputable opinions of mathematicians give us a defeasible but prima
facie reason to hold that they do exist. Aristotle offers the distinction
between qualified and unqualified being so to resolve the difficulties of this
commitment.
Because the contemporary fictionalist denies that mathematical terms
refer to existing objects, she must say that mathematics is, strictly speaking,
false. Aristotle appears to endorse some kind of fictionalism yet he holds
that mathematics is true. This problem of ascribing fictionalism to Aristotle
arises because the contemporary framework presupposes a unitary account
of ontological commitment; and Aristotle, I suggest, would deny this
presupposition. To flesh out this point, we might distinguish between weak
and strong ontological commitment. Weak ontological commitment is to
entities which exist but not necessarily to entities which unqualifiedly exist
or are ontologically independent entities. Strong ontological commitment, by
contrast, is to unqualifiedly existing objects. A term in a true statement
carries for Aristotle weak ontological commitment to entities which exist.
But a term in a true statement need not carry strong ontological
commitment to unqualifiedly existing objects. So a sentence is true for
Aristotle only if its terms are at least weakly ontologically committing.
Strong ontological commitment is sufficient but unnecessary for truth.
Correspondingly there are two kinds of fictionalism. Some fictionalists hold




































existing. Aristotle’s fiction is that mathematicians treat what exists merely
dependently as if it exists independently.
I will bring the paper to a conclusion. The distinction between weak and
strong ontological commitment resolves our interpretative difficulty. There
is good reason to ascribe fictionalism to Aristotle. And this ascription is
consistent with Aristotle’s view that mathematical assertions are true. This
resolution does not in itself answer the questions, in what precise way do
mathematical objects exist and how do mathematical objects depend on
sensible substances for their ontological status. But I will leave discussion of
this topic for another occasion.32
University of Alberta
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